in conventionally accepted ways. The constituency of viewers, it might be added, has its own institutional supports, like newspaper criticism, the educational establishment, and, once again, distributors like PBS which determine how a film is labeled and the context in which it is seen. 8 The key factor that defines the community of practitioners, Nichols maintains, is "a common, self-chosen mandate to represent the historical world rather than imaginary ones." The corpus of texts is defined by an "informing logic" that involves "a representation, case, or argument about the historical world." The constituency of viewers is defined by two common assumptions: first, that "the images we see (and many of the sounds we hear) had their origin in the historical world" and, second, that documentaries do not merely portray the historical world but make some sort of "argument" about it.9 The definitive factor in every case is "the historical world." Whether you are looking at why documentaries are made, how they are put together, or how they are interpreted, what conventionally defines them, Nichols suggests, is their relationship to "the historical world." Specifically, he claims, they make "arguments" about it.
Notice the similarity between this definition of documentary and Grierson's, "the creative treatment of actuality." For "the creative treatment of," Nichols substitutes "an argument about"; for "actuality," he substitutes "historical reality." Like Grierson's definition, Nichols's might seem to beg the difficult question of just what constitutes "actuality" or "historical reality." Actually, Nichols goes on to discuss this at some length.
The historical world, Nichols suggests, is not just something that we imagine, even though we can have no perception of it that is not mediated by our imagination of it. The historical world is something that lies outside and beneath all our representations of it. It is a "brute reality" in which "objects collide, actions occur, [and] forces take their toll."10 Documentary is therefore not the representation of an imaginary reality; it is an imaginative representation of an actual historical reality. This aligns Nichols's definition of documentary more closely with the common-sense definition of Grierson than with those that suggest that documentary is no more than a kind of fiction that denies its fictional status. Of course, our perceptions of and ideas about historical (i.e., actual) reality can only be communicated to others in conventional ways. It is in working out these conventional practices that Nichols's three arenas of discourse-the community of practitioners, the corpus of texts, and the constituency of viewers-come into play.
One can neatly sum up Nichols's definition of documentary as the use of conventional means to refer to, represent, or make claims about historical reality. This seems a good starting point. There remains one problem, however. There are many fiction films that refer to, represent, or make claims about historical reality. Spike Lee's School Daze, for example, portrays tensions in the student body of a fictional all-black college-tensions that include strong differences of opinion on the issue of whether the college should divest its holdings in companies that do business in South Africa. In 1987, when the film was made, this issue was certainly a historical reality on many college campuses. At the end of School Daze, the main character rouses the whole campus early in the morning by ringing a bell and shouting "Wake up! Wake up!" His antagonist throughout the film, a cynical and exploitative frat boy, approaches and faces him, implausibly weeping. Both turn to look at the camera and, through the camera, at the audience. "Please, wake up," the main character says, and an alarm clock rings. This scene telegraphs to most viewers that the film has a point to make-an "argument," if you will-and that point clearly has to do, in part, with the historical reality of South African apartheid. By Nichols's definition, School Daze would appear to be a documentary. Obviously, though, most viewers do not think of it as one. Nichols tries to solve this problem by saying that fiction films that refer to or represent reality do so "metaphorically." Neorealism, for example, "presents a world like the historical world and asks that we view it, and experience the viewing of it, like the viewing, and experience, of history itself."" This explanation does nothing to illuminate the ending of School Daze, however, which points to historical reality without resembling it in the least and without explicitly comparing it to anything else.
Compare this to the beginning of Wiseman's High School (1968), in which the ugly brick facade of Philadelphia's Northeast High is shot from a passing car in a way that makes it look like a factory. The sequence ends with a lingering shot of the back of a delivery truck that says "Penn Maid Products." All the while on the soundtrack, presumably from the car radio, Otis Redding sings "sitting on the dock of the bay, wasting time. .. ." If the reference to reality in School Daze is a metaphor and the reference to reality in this sequence is not, Nichols fails to make clear how and why this is so.
Carl Plantinga calls on the philosophy of art of Nicholas Wolterstorff to suggest a more illuminating way to distinguish between the way in which allegorical fiction films like School Daze refer to reality and the way that documentaries like High School do.'2 Wolterstorff suggests that all representational works, including both documentaries and fiction films, "project a world." This world is an imaginary one since, being the product of a work of art, it is the expression of someone's imagination (even though it may be his or her imagination of reality). Like the world of everyday experience, it can consist of things, events, people, causes and effects, categories, general laws, and so forth. In a given projected world, any or all of these things can be lumped together under the term "a state of affairs." A representational work of art, then, can be said to project certain states of affairs. This argument is so far fairly uncontroversial, even though the terminology is novel.
Wolterstorff claims that a world or state of affairs can be projected with various "stances." A storyteller typically takes a "fictive" stance. "To take up the fictive stance toward some state of affairs is not to assert that the state of affairs is true, is not to ask whether it is true, is not to request that it be made true, is not to wish that it were true. It is simply to invite us to consider a state of affairs."13 The purpose is simply to show or describe a world, to present it, not to make claims about it. In contrast, an "assertive" stance toward some state of affairs does make claims about it. It claims, specifically, that a certain state of affairs is or was so. Plantinga suggests that just such a stance-an "assertive" stance-distinguishes documentaries from fiction films. Like fiction films, he says, documentaries present a world for our consideration. Unlike fiction films, they make claims about it.
Here there is a possible point of dispute. An "assertive stance" cannot be put into a text by the producer, once for all time. It is not something that is built into texts at all. For example, there is nothing about the form or style of the opening sequence of High School that sets it apart from similar-looking sequences in lowbudget fiction films. In fact, the selfsame sequence could in principle be used to begin a work of fiction. So, rather than saying that a documentary makes assertions, we need to say that a documentary is perceived to make assertions. Whether or not a text is perceived to make assertions is partly a matter of conventions (e.g., whether the text looks like a documentary is supposed to look) and partly a matter of the discursive context (e.g., how the distributor labels and describes the program). This is how Plantinga sidesteps the intentionalist implications of Wolterstorff's theory.
Let us return to the problem of how to distinguish an allegorical fiction film, like School Daze, from a documentary, like High School. An assertive stance is not the exclusive domain of documentaries. Fiction can also take an assertive stance toward the states of affairs it projects, as Plantinga points out. Jesus's parables and Aesop's fables are two of the examples he gives. These imply or state outright that they have a point to make-an argument or "moral" that has some bearing on reality. But there is a difference between such assertions, Plantinga claims, and the kind of assertions that characterize documentaries. When fiction makes assertions about reality, it proposes an analogy or similarity between a projected state of affairs and the real world. In contrast, a documentary asserts that a projected state of affairs is true in the real world. Fiction can make assertions of similarity, but documentaries make assertions of truth. Or, as Plantinga puts it, fictional films may assert or imply broad artistic truths. "Documentary films may also assert broad, artistic truths, but they in addition assert that the particular states of affairs represented actually occurred."l14
The "Wake up! Wake up!" at the end of School Daze is at the same time a call to action in the historical world and an assertion that states of affairs portrayed earlier in the film are similar to states of affairs in the historical world. But it is not a truth claim. High School makes some of the same kind of claims, such as the implied claim that Northeast High is like a factory. But unlike School Daze, High School also makes specific truth claims: that the Penn Maid truck was not "planted" in the scene but really happened to be driving by; that the Otis Redding song actually played on the radio at some point during the filming, etc.'5 It is these latter claims-things in the film that, on the basis of convention, are perceived to be truth claims-that make High School a documentary, according to Plantinga This scene seems to depend for its effects on something besides "argument." It seems to rely on melodrama, on sentiment, on the emotional resonance that Sullivan Ballou's letter has for viewers. One might say that instead of stressing the syntagmatic connections between elements-the horizontal links: sequence, logic, cause and effect, and so forth-this scene emphasizes the paradigmatic dimension, piling meaning upon meaning to create a kind of emotional depth. In this scene, which many viewers held to be exemplary of what made the whole series interesting and special as a documentary, this rhetorical operation seems to be far more crucial and certainly quite different from what Nichols calls argument.
There is no doubt that the scene does have a certain persuasive force. There are many ways in which it successfully manipulates viewer responses and can be perceived to advance hidden agendas. For example, the melancholy music seems designed to wring emotions from viewers. The sentimental letter, the romantic portraits, and the arty shots of cannons in the sunset all tend to romanticize war. The notion of noble sacrifice implicit in this scene seems intended to stir nationalistic sentiments, as well. All of these features might be said to work in quasiargumentational fashion. Still, attention to these quasi-argumentational features is nothing like the typical response reflected in reviews and letters to the producer. The typical response is evidently not to approach the text as a rhetorical construct (as film scholars are wont to do) but to see it as something else entirely.
However one might wish to construe the term argument-as a series of explicit propositions, as an implicit stance, as the assertion of historicity, etc.-it appears that viewers do not, in general, interpret the love-letter scene as an argument. The typical reading is closer to that of melodramatic fiction. It seems to involve imaginary involvement or "identification" with the soldier anticipating his death or with the wife reading this letter from her late husband. It prompts thoughts about viewers' own dear ones or, occasionally, reflections on the heroism of soldiers or the tragedy of war. Viewers who respond to this scene in such a fashion do not appear to look for or examine or even particularly care about the truth claims or arguments it may make. 17 On the other hand, viewers seem to assume that the scene is telling the truth, even though they do not pay attention to its particular truth claims. This assumption is precisely what makes it possible for viewers to ignore the truth claims. It is what makes it possible for them to focus on the melodrama in the scene rather than on its historical arguments. The assumption that the film is telling the truth also serves to validate their emotional responses to the scene. If the letter were presumed to be a fake, its emotional impact would no doubt be considerably diminished. In fact, a small controversy did arise when it was discovered that the letter quoted in the scene is actually just one of several differently worded "copies" of a letter for which no original could be found.'8 So, I hypothesize that the assumption that documentaries in general "tell the truth" (or are supposed to) precedes and lies beneath the interpretation of particular documentaries, even though people may make sense of a documentary in altogether different terms-as melodrama, for example. In any event, it seems clear that viewers do not ordinarily regard the love-letter scene from The Civil War as a kind of argument and they do not ordinarily look for or attend to its truth claims.
It is therefore not quite accurate to suggest, as Nichols and Plantinga do, that documentaries are films that are perceived to make arguments or truth claims about historical reality, because they are not-at least not all of the time. It is more correct to say that documentaries are presumed to be truthful, even though considerations about the veracity of particular assertions may play little role in how viewers actually make sense of them.
A neater way to say this might be that a documentary is any film, video, or TV program that could, in principle, be perceived to lie. I suggest that this is more than a handy heuristic for the purposes of analysis; it actually conforms to the heuristic that people carry around in their heads. It does not produce a nice, neat, sharply defined set of texts but a fuzzy-edged, somewhat flexible one like the mental category "documentary" that we actually go by. This is not to say, nor does Worth say, that pictures cannot be used to lie or perceived to lie. To the contrary. As I pointed out, if I distribute a composite photograph of a senator toasting a gangster whom he has actually never met, I am surely lying-by implication if not explicitly. The reason is that people in our culture are very familiar with the mechanical means by which photographs are created. Even though the technologies for producing "trick" or "fake" photographs are also becoming increasingly well known, these technologies can make it virtually impossible for even a sophisticated viewer to distinguish a fake photograph from an authentic ofte. Accordingly, it is usually considered to be unacceptable-a kind of lie-to mislead people by circulating a fake photograph without explicitly stating that it is fake. Recall the flap that TV Guide created some years ago by superimposing the dieting Oprah Winfrey's head onto Ann-Margret's body for its cover photo. Had scissors marks been evident, no one would have complained. The scandal in this case was that the fakery was too good to be obvious.25 The presumption that photographically produced images "tell the truth" is a very powerful one in our society. Yet there is nothing in the images themselves that makes this so. Just consider how easily we put that presumption aside when we go to the movies. The point here, again, is not that movies cannot, in effect, lie. There is no question that they can. The point is that when viewers perceive movies to lie (or, for that matter, to "tell the truth"), that perception is with few exceptions a product of the metatextual label or interpretive framework that they apply to the text, not a product of the form of the text per se.
Admittedly, the form of the text can prompt viewers to "frame" it in a particular way. ("Framing" is a term used by sociolinguists to describe the process of applying a metatextual label or interpretive framework to a discourse.)"2 For example, a jiggly camera, poor lighting, and bad sound suggest, "This is cinema verite." Still, there is nothing about the form of such footage that demands that it be framed in a particular fashion. There is nothing in the form of School Daze that prevents viewers from framing it in a way that The filmmaker, supposedly a production student working on an assignment, is filming a woman friend in her apartment as she puts on makeup and gets ready to go out to a movie. The woman is understandably at somewhat of a loss for things to say. After a few minutes, she lets it drop that she was raped the previous evening. The filmmaker (who like any good documentarian is quick to exploit a moment of potential drama) proceeds to cajole, challenge, and cross-examine her to get her to elaborate on the incident. Despite the woman's attempts to change the subject, the filmmaker badgers her about it relentlessly-saying, for example, that he doubts her story because she seems so cavalier about it-until she breaks down. Then, instead of apologizing, he justifies himself. He refuses to turn off the camera, despite her repeated entreaties, until she finally leaves the apartment.
The film scrupulously copies the look of a verit6 documentary. The camera is handheld and the camerawork is a bit awkward, the rooms are unevenly lit, there is no nondiegetic sound, and the film consists of what appears to be a single unbroken long take. There are actually a couple of seams where the filmmakers stop the camera to change magazines, but they are so well hidden that you do not see them unless you look for them carefully. The acting in the film is impeccableas naturally self-conscious (or self-consciously natural) as a "real" verit6 performance. The only conspicuous indication that this film is not really a documentary is the credit sequence, at the end of the film, which identifies the characters in the film as actors.
So many things about this film label it a documentary-from the title, to comments made by the characters, to the rigorous adherence to documentary conventions-that viewers tend to overlook or ignore the contradictory end credits. When they are told that the film is, indeed, a fiction film-scripted, rehearsed, and acted out-their reading of the film undergoes a remarkable transformation. The film produces dramatically different kinds of response when viewers see it as a fiction film than when they regard it as a documentary. And since it is the selfsame footage, it cannot be the form or style or "content" of the film that determines which of the two ways it is read.
When people first watch No Lies, without having been told beforehand that it is a fake documentary or a fiction film, they become visibly disturbed at the distress to which the filmmaker is subjecting the woman. They report feeling very sorry for the woman and extremely angry at the filmmaker in the film, whom they assume to be the creative agent of the film, as well. When they are persuaded that the film is, indeed, a fiction, much of their anger is displaced from the filmmaker in the film to the filmmaker behind the film. Since the filmmaker in the film is just an actor playing a role, it is no longer appropriate to be angry at him for being cruel to the woman. One can still be angry at his character, of course, but the target of the anger has shifted. Even though the anger is still genuine, it is now directed at a person who is regarded as imaginary, rather than at one who is supposed to be real. Besides that anger, though, viewers now feel angry at having been duped. Worth calls this "media rage";28 it is like the anger people felt at Plantinga suggests that all one needs to do to adequately define documentary is determine which texts are indexed as documentary within a given sociocultural milieu, and then one has a de facto definition. One has specified the common usage of the term, just as good dictionary definitions are supposed to do. In fact, Plantinga claims, one has specified precisely what we collectively believe documentaries to be.
Although this might seem to be a sensible and straightforward way to pin down what we collectively believe documentaries to be, I would argue that it has three fatal flaws. First, as I pointed out at the start of this essay, determining which texts are indexed as documentary in our culture and which are not is not merely tricky, it is impossible. Texts like Daughter Rite and No Lies, and even well-known and popular texts like JFK and episodes of A Current Affair, are not neatly indexed in one way or the other. They are ambiguously indexed or indexed in a way that allows them to be read as either documentary or fiction or intermittently as one then the other. Plantinga suggests using a "weighted global average" to determine whether texts like these should be called documentaries.32 But, at this point, the problem of definition has become largely an academic exercise. Moreover, it is an exercise that can lead one to trivialize the complexity of marginal, ambiguous, and mixed texts.
Second, Plantinga's approach to definition ignores the extent to which people apply frames like "documentary" in variable ways, depending upon their changing aims and interests. People have considerable choice in how to interpret or "frame" any discourse. It is easy, as I have pointed out, to regard School Daze as a documentary of sorts if one asks questions of the text that invite such a stance. Conversely, it is quite possible to "read" The Civil War as though the whole text were make-believe, if one is so inclined.
Finally, Plantinga's approach writes off certain unconventional readings and unusual applications of texts as "wrong." Aside from the political implications of doing this, it is obviously not a very practical approach to the problem of how people really do make sense of documentaries. If one's primary concern is to determine which texts belong in the canon of documentary and which do not, then it may be necessary to discard idiosyncratic readings. If, on the other hand, one wishes to establish the particular ways in which people see documentaries as special and distinct, it is important not to discount unusual or ambivalent "readings." This is especially so because, as No Lies amply demonstrates, the label documentary is not necessarily attached to texts in any fixed way. Nor is it attached to every element in a text. The ending of Schindler's List (1993), for example, is clearly set apart as something different from the rest of the film-something special: "documentary." So, if one wishes to analyze documentaries as an actual form of discourse rather than as an abstract category of text, the real problem is not how to categorize whole texts but how people make sense of those particular moments and elements of films that they frame as documentary-whenever that may be.
Nevertheless, Plantinga and Carroll are quite correct in pointing out that there is a high degree of agreement among viewers of movies in our culture about when the label documentary applies and when it does not or, to put it differently, about when viewers are supposed to frame a film as nonfiction. The reason is that in almost every movie-viewing situation, there is a plethora of conventional cues that signal how the discourse is supposed to be framed. Texts generally come to us "indexed" in one way or another, even though viewers always have the option to ignore a text's "indexing" and to appropriate it in some other fashion.
It would be interesting to explore further the question of just what kind of situational cues tend to "index" a text as a documentary in our culture. In fact, there are already a great many excellent studies of the conventional forms and techniques of documentaries that, in effect, do just that. But the question that has been neglected, and the one to which I have been devoting my attention here, is the question of what it is that distinguishes or characterizes the frame that people bring to texts that they regard as documentaries. This is something different from what "indexes" a discourse as documentary in the first place, even though the "frame" and the "indexes" tend to be attached to the same texts.
Some texts are almost invariably framed in a way that precludes asking true or false questions about them. In ordinary circumstances, it almost never makes sense to ask of a Georgia O'Keeffe painting of a skull on a rose whether it is true or false. Magritte's painting of a pipe with the caption "Ceci n'est pas une pipe" whimsically makes this same point. The same thing also applies to the illustrations in story books and to romance novels. In addition, it almost invariably applies to fiction films-even fiction films with an obvious "message" or "moral" like School Daze.
The ending of School Daze obviously refers to the historical reality of apartheid in South Africa. It asserts certain things, too, such as a similarity between college cliquishness and racial prejudice. It even makes an argument-that we all have prejudices that we need to wake up to. It nevertheless makes no sense to say that the scene might be lying. School Daze is also full of wildly implausible events, like a musical dance number in which two factions of coeds act out a confrontation over hair styles. Still, no matter how fantastic and far-fetched a scene like this might seem, it would again be inappropriate to suggest that it might be lying. Because of the way School Daze is framed (under ordinary circumstances) the question "Might it be lying?" just does not pertain.
The Plantinga actually argues that this is how viewers categorize documentaries. Even if this is to some extent correct, viewers clearly tolerate some ambiguity in assigning such labels which tends to vanish when ambiguous labels are assigned in an absolute way. 33. There is one other alternative theory that deserves to be mentioned, at least in passing.
Roger Odin maintains, as I do and for similar reasons, that what distinguishes documentary is a particular mode of reception. He calls this mode of reception (following the French propensity to invent new jargon) a "documentarizing reading." The essential criterion of such a reading, Odin argues, is "the construction by the reader of an Enunciator which is presupposed to be real." Odin's notion of an Enunciator is extremely broad and somewhat idiosyncratic. It is not necessarily a person or people; it is anything that is supposed to be responsible for some aspect of the film. For example, Monument Valley may be deemed one Enunciator of a western to the extent it is supposed to impress itself on the film in a significant way. In the same way, society, historical events, the camera, an institution, or a narrator are all potential Enunciators in a documentarizing reading. There are two considerations that distinguish a documentarizing reading, according to Odin. The first is that the reader must attend to an Enunciator of the film and regard it as significant. The second is that the reader must consider this Enunciator to be "real. 
